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ISSUE PAPER
Remedies - How Far and How Much?
By George Addy* & Anita Banicevic**
One of the age-old questions that pervades every area of
antitrust law is how to craft the appropriate remedy once conduct has
been found to contravene antitrust laws. In general, the appropriate
approach to remedies has historically been paid less attention than
how to define or identify the problematic conduct itself. However, the
central role that remedies have played in recent high profile unilateral
conduct cases, as well as the remedies ordered by the European
Commission (the "EC") and recently upheld by the European Court
of First Instance ("CFI") in Microsoft, have moved remedies to the
forefront of discussion for unilateral conduct.
The need for a precise scalpel rather than a blunt
sledgehammer to craft the appropriate remedy is arguably amplified
in unilateral conduct cases where there is a need to maintain a fine
balance between discouraging "anti-competitive" conduct and
encouraging aggressive but competitive behavior. With record fines
issued by the EC in unilateral conduct cases and the CFI's recent
decision to uphold the EC's decision in Microsoft, the debate
continues as to whether, in this context, fines are necessary or
adequate, behavioral remedies are workable, and structural remedies
are ever appropriate. The appropriate approach to remedies in
unilateral conduct cases is an inescapable point for consideration in
our "marathon" of discussions.
The approach to remedies in unilateral conduct cases differs
widely across the major antitrust jurisdictions. For instance, in
Canada, with the exception of the airline industry, the underlying
legislation does not allow for the imposition of any kind of fines once
conduct has been found to contravene the "abuse of dominance"
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provisions. While the Canadian Competition Bureau has attempted to
initiate legislative amendments to introduce "administrative monetary
penalties" of up to $10 million or every contravention of the abuse of
dominance provisions, these proposed amendments have failed to
find traction due to a variety of reasons, including opposition from
the Canadian private competition bar.
In other jurisdictions, the imposition of fines or administrative
penalties appears to have become de rigueur in unilateral conduct
cases and an accepted method of deterring and perhaps punishing
unilateral conduct. Telefonica was recently fined € 151 million by the
EC for abusing its dominant position by charging excessively high
prices to its competitors for access to its infrastructure in the Spanish
broadband market.' One of the factors that the EC cited as part of its
rationale for issuing a higher fine in this case (as compared to other
Article 82 cases involving the broadband market) was that
Telefonica's "behaviour shows that the fines imposed in those cases
did not have a sufficient deterrent effect". 2 Similarly, Mittal Steel was
recently fined US $93 million by the South African Competition
Tribunal for charging excessively high prices in the domestic market
for its products. 3 The South African Competition Tribunal justified its
decision to fine Mittal by explaining that through exercise of its
market power and ancillary restraints, Mittal was able to effectively
"fix prices" for its products at a supra-competitive level without
having to engage in any horizontal agreements with competitors.
Although the Tribunal acknowledged that the conduct at issue was
not criminal in nature, it nonetheless found the conduct to be
egregious and "akin to price-fixing".
In some cases, such as the most recent decision of the CFI in
Microsoft, significant fines were only a part of the overall remedy for
the conduct at issue. In what is perhaps the most glaring illustration
of the divergence in approach to remedies between the United States
and European Union, the CFI upheld the original remedies ordered
See Antitrust: Commission Fines Telef6nica Over E151 Million for Over Five
Years of Unfair Prices in the Spanish Broadband Market, available at
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/07/1 011 &format#PDF
&aged= 1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en.
2 See Antitrust: Commission Decision Against Telef6nica - Frequently Asked
Questions, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference =
MEMO/07/274&format=-PDF&aged= 1 &language=EN&guiLanguage=en.
3 See Harmony Gold Mining Ltd. Durban Roodepoort Deep Ltd. and Mittal
Steel S. Africa Ltd. Macsteel Int'l Holdings BV, Competition Tribunal South
Africa available at http://www.comptrib.co.za/ listjudgement.asp?jid=97.
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by the Commission including: (i) a fine of €497 million; (ii) requiring
Microsoft to offer for sale within the European Economic Area a
version of its operating system without Windows Media Player; and
(iii) perhaps most controversially, requiring Microsoft to provide its
workgroup server rivals complete interface information so that their
software can interoperate seamlessly with Microsoft's operating
system and workgroup servers.
The requirements for Microsoft to release its own proprietary
intellectual property to its rivals and to remove Windows Media
Player from its product have generated significant debate and
commentary. Many have taken the position that such remedies
unfairly and unnecessarily protect competitors rather than
competition as a whole. Furthermore, some individuals have
questioned whether such remedies effectively chill innovation and
unnecessarily reduce the incentive for dominant companies to
compete vigorously.4
The divergence between the approach adopted by the EC and
now the CF and the US in Microsoft highlights not only the
divergence in the approach to appropriate remedies but also the
divergence in the underlying characterization of unilateral conduct
itself. FTC Commissioner J. Thomas Rosch recently attributed this
clear divergence to different schools of economic thought with the
Chicago School approach preferred in the United States and the postChicago School reflected in the European Union's approach to
unilateral conduct. Clearly, the approach to remedies is inextricably
linked to the jurisdiction's underlying economic approach and views
regarding the egregiousness of unilateral conduct as a whole.
Regardless of the approach that one ascribes to, the
divergence in approach between regulators in major jurisdictions in
the treatment of dominant firms raises potential compliance issues for
global companies. Furthermore, remedies ordered in one jurisdiction
could potentially impact a company's operation outside such
jurisdiction. For instance, while the EC's remedies in Microsoft are
theoretically constrained to Europe, since Microsoft's competitors are
4 See e.g. Assistant Attorney General For Antitrust, Thomas 0. Barnett,
Issues Statement On European Microsoft Decision available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press-releases/2007/226070.htm (reacting to the
CFI's decision).

5 See J. Thomas Rosch, I say Monopoly, You say Dominance: The Continuing
Divide on the Treatment of Dominant Firms, is it the Economics?, Fed. Trade
Comm. available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/rosch/070908isaymonopoly
iba.pdf.
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similarly global entities, one wonders whether the impact of the EC's
remedies will, on a practical level, be limited to Europe. Questions
have also been raised about the potential for "overregulation" of
global companies where multiple enforcers are involved and multiple
remedies are suggested. In such cases, should (as some antitrust
scholars have previously suggested) enforcement agencies take into
consideration and address the rationale and remedies adopted by
other enforcers? Along with the potential for "overregulation" when
multiple enforcers are involved, concerns have also been raised about
enforcement authorities attempting to use the severity of remedies
ordered in unilateral conduct cases to "one up" each other in the
global enforcement arena.
Unlike cartel cases, where punishment and deterrence is often
the goal of extracting high fines, given the difficulty in distinguishing
between "good" and "bad" conduct, it is questionable whether the
same goal should be pursued in unilateral conduct cases.

